sexual liberalization. The cultural gulf separating Islam from the West involves Eros far more than Demos.
In seeking to understand the causes of the events of 9/11 many popular commentators have turned to Samuel P. Huntington's provocative and controversial thesis of a 'clash of civilizations.' This account emphasized that the end of the Cold War brought new dangers. "In the new world, " Huntington argued (1996:28) warfare, and even the disparities between rich and poor nations, have been overshadowed in the twenty-rst century by Weberian culture. This in uential account appeared to offer insights into the causes of violent ethno-religious con icts exempli ed by Bosnia, the Caucuses, the Middle East, and Kashmir. It seemed to explain the failure of political reform to take root in many Islamic states, despite the worldwide resurgence of electoral democracies around the globe. The framework seemed to provide a powerful lens that the American media used to interpret the underlying reasons for the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center. Commentators often saw 9/11 as a full-scale assault on the global hegemony of America, in particular, and a reaction by Islamic fundamentalists against Western culture, in general. Nevertheless, the Huntington thesis has been highly controversial. The claim of rising ethnic con ict in the post-Cold War era has come under repeated and sustained attack (Gurr 2000; Russett, O'Neal and Cox 2000; Fox 2001; Chirot 2001; Henderson and Tucker 2001; Fox 2001) . Many scholars have challenging the existence of a single Islamic culture stretching all the way from Jakarta to Lagos, let alone one that held values deeply incompatible with democracy (Kabuli 1994; Esposito and Voll 1996; Shadid 2001) . What has been less widely examined, however, is systematic empirical evidence of whether the publics in Western and Islamic societies share similar or deeply divergent values, and, in particular, whether any important differences between these cultures rest on democratic values (as Huntington claims) or on social values (as modernization theories suggest).
This study seeks to throw new light on this issue by examining cultural values in seventy-ve nations around the globe, including nine predominately Islamic societies, utilizing the World Values Survey/European Values Survey (WVS/EVS) [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] . Part I brie y outlines the Huntington thesis and the response by critics. Part II lays out the study's research design including the core hypothesis, comparative framework, and survey data. Part III analyzes the evidence. The conclusion summarizes the results and re ects on their implications. The evidence con rms the rst claim in Huntington's thesis: culture does matter, and matter a lot: religious legacies leave a distinct and lasting imprint on contemporary values. But Huntington is mistaken in assuming that the core 'clash' between the West and Islamic societies concerns political values: instead the evidence indicates that surprisingly similar attitudes towards democracy are found in the West and the Islamic world. We do nd signi cant cross-cultural differences concerning the role of religious leaders in politics and society, but these attitudes divide the West from many other countries around the globe, not just Islamic ones. The original thesis erroneously assumed that the primary cultural fault line between the West and Islam concerns government, overlooking a stronger cultural divide based on issues of gender equality and sexual liberalization. Cohort analysis suggests that as younger generations in the West have gradually become more liberal on these issues, this has generated a growing cultural gap, with Islamic nations remaining the most traditional societies in the world. The central values separating Islam and the West revolve far more centrally around Eros than Demos.
Part I: The 'Clash of Civilizations' Debate
The 'clash of civilizations' thesis advances three central claims. First, Huntington suggests that 'culture matters'; in particular that contemporary values in different societies are path-dependent, re ecting long-standing legacies associated with core 'civilizations.' The concept of 'civilization' is understood by Huntington as a 'culture writ large': "It is de ned both by common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identi cation of people." (Huntington 1996:41-43) . Of these factors, Huntington sees religion as the central de ning element (p. 47), although he also distinguishes regional sub-divisions within the major world religions, such as the distinct role of Catholicism in Western Europe and Latin America, due to their different historical traditions and political legacies.
Second, the 'clash' thesis claims that there are sharp cultural differences between the core political values common in societies sharing a Western Christian heritage -particularly those concerning representative democracy -and the beliefs common in the rest of the world, especially Islamic societies. For Huntington, the de ning features of Western civilization include the separation of religious and secular authority, the rule of law and social pluralism, the parliamentary institutions of representative government, and the protection of individual rights and civil liberties as the buffer between citizens and the power of the state: "Individually almost none of these factors was unique to the West. The combination of them was, however, and this is what gave the West its distinctive quality." (1996:70-71) Other accounts have commonly stressed that the complex phenomenon of 'modernization' encompasses many additional social values that challenge traditional beliefs, notably faith in scienti c and technological progress, belief in the role of economic competition in the marketplace, and the diffusion of modern social mores, exempli ed by sexual liberalization and equality for women (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Baker 2000; Inglehart and Norris 2003) . But Huntington's claim is that the strongest distinguishing characteristic of Western culture, the aspect which demarcates Western Christianity most clearly from the Muslim and Orthodox worlds, concerns the values associated with representative democracy. This claim is given plausibility by the failure of electoral democracy to take root in most states in the Middle East and North Africa (see Midlarsky 1998) . According to the annual assessment made by the Freedom House (2002), of the 192 countries around the world, two-thirds (121) are electoral democracies. Of the 47 countries with an Islamic majority, one quarter (11) are electoral democracies. Furthermore, none of the core Arabic-speaking societies in the Middle East and North Africa falls into this category. Given this pattern, in the absence of survey evidence concerning the actual beliefs of Islamic publics, it is commonly assumed that they have little faith in the principles or performance of democracy, preferring strong leadership and rule by traditional religious authorities to the democratic values of pluralistic competition, political participation, and political rights and civil liberties.
Lastly, Huntington argues that important and long-standing differences in political values based on predominant religious cultures will lead to con ict between and within nation-states, with the most central problems of global politics arising from an ethno-religious 'clash.' 1 It remains unclear whether Huntington is claiming that the core cleavage concerns Western democratic values versus the developing world, or whether the main contrast lies as a fault line between the West and Islam, but the latter has been the primary popular interpretation of the thesis, and the one which has aroused the most heated debate.
Middle Eastern area studies specialists, scholars of the Koran, and students of Islamic law have contested a series of issues about the 'clash' thesis. Critics have challenged the notion of a single Islamic 1 International relations scholars have strongly challenged the evidence for Huntington's claim that ethnic inter-state con ict has increased during the 1990s (Gurr 2000; Russett, Oneal and Cox 2000; Fox 2001; Chirot 2001; Henderson and Tucker 2001) , although this body of work is not central to the argument presented here.
culture, pointing to substantial contrasts found among one billion people living in diverse Islamic nations, such as Pakistan, Jordan, Azerbaijan, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Turkey, and the differences between Muslims who are radical or moderate, traditional or modern, conservative or liberal, hard-line or revisionist (Hunter 1998; Esposito 1997; Fuller 2002) . Observers stress the manifold differences within the Islamic world due to historical traditions and colonial legacies, ethnic cleavages, levels of economic development, and the role and power of religious fundamentalists in different states, claiming that it makes little sense to lump together people living in Jakarta, Riyadh, and Istanbul. Along similar lines, the idea that we can recognize a single culture of 'Western Christianity' is to over-simplify major cross-national differences, even among af uent postindustrial societies as super cially similar as the United States, Italy, and Sweden, for example the contrasts between Catholic Mediterranean Europe and Protestant Scandinavia, as well as among social sectors and religious denominations within each country.
Moreover, setting this issue aside for the moment, even if we accept the existence of a shared 'Islamic' culture, scholars have also argued that the core values and teaching of the Koran are not incompatible with those of democracy (Kabuli 1994; Esposito and Voll 1996; Shadid 2001) . Edward Said (2001) decried Huntington's thesis as an attempt to revive the 'black-white,' 'us-them,' or 'good-evil' world dichotomy that had been so prevalent during the height of the Cold War, substituting threats from 'Islamic terrorists' for those from 'Communist spies.' Western leaders, seeking to build a global coalition against the followers of Osama Bin Laden, took pains to distance themselves from the clash of civilizations thesis, stressing deep divisions within the Islamic world between the extreme fundamentalists and moderate Muslims. Leaders emphasized that the events of September 11 th arose from the extreme ideological beliefs held by particular splinter groups of Al-Qaeda and Taliban fundamentalists, not from mainstream Muslim public opinion. Just as it would be a mistake to understand the 1995 bombing in Oklahoma City as a collective attack on the federal government by all Christian fundamentalists, rather than the work of a few individuals, it may inappropriate to view the attack by AlQaeda terrorists on symbols of American capitalism and nancial power as a new 'clash of civilizations' between Islamic and Western cultures.
As well as challenging the basic premises of the 'clash of civilizations' thesis, alternative explanations of radical Islamic fundamentalism suggest that the underlying root causes lie in deep disparities between rich and poor within societies, buttressed by the pervasive inequalities in political power in Middle Eastern regimes (Chirot 2001) . Structural or neo-Marxist theories suggest that the best predictors of radical disaffection lie in uneven patterns of modernization around the world and the existence of pervasive inequalities within many Muslim societies. The most important cleavage may be between middle class, more af uent, educated and professional social sectors on the one hand, -the teachers, doctors, and lawyers in Cairo, Beirut and Islamabad -and the sub-strata of poorer, uneducated, and unemployed younger men living in Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Syria who, if disaffected, may become willing recruits to Islamic fundamentalist causes. Huntington distinguishes certain demographic characteristics of Islamic societies, notably the phenomena of the 'youth bulge,' but does not pursue the consequences of this generational pattern, in particular whether younger men from poorer sectors of society are particularly prone to political disaffection.
Yet there are plausible alternative theories about the major cultural contrasts we could expect to nd between Islam and the West. In work presented elsewhere (Inglehart and Norris 2003) we document how the modernization process has transformed values by generating a rising tide of support for equality between women and men in post-industrial societies, and greater approval in these societies of a more permissive and liberal sexuality, including tolerance of divorce, abortion and homosexuality. The version of modernization theory developed by Inglehart (1997) hypothesizes that human development generates changed cultural attitudes in virtually any society, although values also re ect the imprint of each society's religious legacies and historical experiences. Modernization brings systematic, predictable changes in gender roles. The impact of modernization operates in two key phases: i) Industrialization brings women into the paid work force and dramatically reduces fertility rates. Women attain literacy and educational opportunities. Women are enfranchised and begin to participate in representative government, but still have far less power than men. ii) The postindustrial phase brings a shift toward greater gender equality as women move into higher status economic roles in management and the professions, and gain political in uence within elected and appointed bodies. Over half of the world has not yet entered this phase; only the more advanced industrial societies are currently moving on this trajectory. These two phases correspond to two major dimensions of cross-cultural variation: (i) A transition from traditional to secular-rational values; and (ii) a transition from survival to self-expression values. The decline of the traditional family is linked with the rst dimension. The rise of gender equality is linked with the second. Cultural shifts in modern societies are not suf cient by themselves to guarantee women equality across all major dimensions of life; nevertheless through underpinning structural reforms and women's rights they greatly facilitate this process (Inglehart and Norris 2003) . If this theory is applied to cultural contrasts between modern and traditional societies, it suggests that we would expect one of the key differences between the Western and Islamic worlds to focus around the issues of gender equality and sexual liberalization, rather than the democratic values that are central to Huntington's theory.
Part II: Hypotheses, Comparative Framework, and Data
To summarize, many issues arising from the 'clash' thesis could be considered, but here we focus upon testing two alternative propositions arising from the theoretical debate. Huntington emphasizes that the political values of democracy originated in the West with the separation of church and state, the growth of representative parliamentary institutions, and the expansion of the franchise. As such, he predicts that, despite the more recent emergence and consolidation of 'Third Wave' democracies in many parts of the world, democratic values will be most deeply and widely entrenched in Western societies. If true, we would expect to nd the strongest cultural clash in political values would be between the Western and Islamic worlds. In contrast, Inglehart's modernization theory suggests that a rising tide of support for women's equality and sexual liberalization has left a particularly marked imprint upon richer postindustrial nations, although traditional attitudes continue to prevail in poorer developing societies. Accordingly, given this interpretation, we also test the alternative proposition that any deep-seated cultural divisions between Islam and the West will revolve far more strongly around social rather than political values, especially concerning the issues of sexual liberalization and gender equality.
The issues of cultural con ict and value change have generated considerable controversy but, as yet, almost no systematic survey data has been available to compare public opinion towards politics and society in many Middle Eastern and Western societies. Interpretations by area scholars and anthropologists have relied upon more qualitative sources, including personal interviews, observations and direct experience, and traditional textual exegesis of the literature, religious scriptures, and historical documents (see, for example, Lewis 2002 
Classifying cultural regions
In Huntington's account nine major contemporary civilizations can be identi ed, based largely on the predominant religious legacy in each society:
² Western Christianity (a European culture that subsequently spread to North America, Australia and New Zealand), ² Islamic (including the Middle East, Northern Africa, and parts of South East Asia), ² Orthodox (Russian and Greek), ² Latin American (predominately Catholic yet with a distinct corporatist, authoritarian culture), ² Sinic/Confucian (China, South Korean, Vietnam and Korea), ² Japanese, ² Hindu, ² Buddhist (Sri Lanka, Burma, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia), and (possibly) ² Sub-Saharan Africa. 5 Huntington treats states or societies as the core actors exemplifying these civilizations, although recognizing that populations with particular cultural and religious identities spread well beyond the border of the nation-state. Moreover some plural societies are deeply divided, so there is rarely a clean one-to-one mapping, apart from exceptional cases such as Japan and India.
To analyze the survey evidence for these propositions, societies were classi ed into these categories, (see Table 1 ) based on the predominant (plurality) religious identities within each nation. The survey includes nine societies with a Muslim majority (ranging from 71 to 96 percent), including Jordan, Pakistan, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh and Albania, Morocco, Iran and Egypt. This allows us to compare a range of states within the Islamic world, including semi-democracies with elections and some freedoms, exempli ed by Albania, Turkey and Bangladesh, as well as constitutional monarchies (Jordan), and suspended semi-democracies under military rule (Pakistan). Geographically these nations are located in Central Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia. In addition, the comparative framework includes 22 nations based on 'Western Christianity' (using Huntington's de nition to include both predominately Catholic and Table 1 Classi cation of societies by the historically predominant religion To rule out intervening variables, multivariate regression models compare the in uence of predominant religious cultures in each type of society controlling for levels of human and political development. Modernization theories suggest that this process brings certain predictable shifts in cultural values, including declining belief in traditional sources of religious authority and rising demands for more participatory forms of civic engagement (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Baker 2000; Norris 2002 ). The WVS/EVS survey contains some of the most af uent market economies in the world, such as the US, Japan and Switzerland, with per capita annual incomes as high as $40,000; together with middle-level industrializing countries such as Taiwan, Brazil, and Turkey, as well as poorer agrarian societies, such as Uganda, Nigeria, and Viet Nam, with per capita annual incomes of $300 or less. It also includes many different types of states, including established and newer democracies, semi-democracies, and non-democracies. Accordingly structural differences among societies are measured by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI) 2000, (combining levels of per capita income, literacy and schooling, and longevity), and levels of democratization, which are classi ed based on the 1999-2000 Freedom House analysis of political rights and civil liberties.
6 The structural differences among groups within societies are measured by the standard social indicators, including income (as the most reliable cross-cultural measure of socioeconomic status in different societies), education, gender, age, and religiosity.
The latter was included to see whether the strength of religious beliefs in uenced values more than the type of religious faith or identity (which, like being baptized as a Protestant or Catholic, can be purely nominal). To develop a religiosity scale, factor analysis was used with six indicators selected from the pooled World Values Survey/European Values Survey (WVS/EVS), namely the proportion of the population in different societies: (i) who say that religion is 'very important' in their lives, (ii) who nd comfort in religion, (iii) who believe in God, (iv) who identify themselves as religious, (v) who believe in life after death, and (vi) who attend a religious service regularly. All these items tap values and beliefs common throughout the world's religions and they were carried in all four waves of the WVS/EVS, to facilitate comparison over time. Factor analysis among the pooled sample (not reproduced here) showed that all the items fell into one dimension and formed a consistent and reliable 'strength of religiosity' scale (Cronbach's Alpha = 0.48). After recoding, the scale was standardized to 100-points, for ease of interpretation, where the higher score represents the strongest religiosity.
Measuring Political and Social Values
Attitudes were compared towards three dimensions of political and social values: (i) support for democratic ideals and performance, (ii) attitudes towards political leadership, and (iii) approval of gender equality and sexual liberalization. As argued elsewhere (Norris 1999) , an important distinction needs to be drawn between support for the ideals of democracy and evaluations of the actual performance of democracy. Evidence from previous waves of the World Value Study (Klingemann 1999; Dalton 1999) suggests that citizens in many countries adhere strongly to the general principles of democracy, such as believing that it is the best form of government and disapproving of authoritarian alternatives, and yet at the same time many remain deeply dissatis ed with the way that democratic governments work in practice. The phenomenon of more 'critical citizens' (Norris 1999) or 'disenchanted democrats' (Putnam and Pharr 2001) has been widely observed. To examine these dimensions, attitudes towards the principles and performance of democracy are measured in this study using the items listed in Table 2 , where respondents are invited to express agreement or disagreement with the statements. It should be noted that the performance items do not ask people about their experience of democracy in their own country, such as how well their government works, but rather taps their expectations of how well democratic governments generally function in taking decisions and maintaining order. In addition, it is commonly assumed that one of the primary contrasts between Islamic and Western cultures relates to attitudes towards the role of religious leaders, who exercise power by virtue of their spiritual authority, or secular leaders who hold authority through elective of ce, re ecting deeper beliefs about the separation of church and state. We therefore also monitored support for the role of religious leaders in public life with the items listed in Table 2 . Neither of these items cued respondents with any explicit reference to 'democracy' and indeed, in principle, there is no inconsistency in believing both in the value of spiritual authorities and in the principles of democracy, if the religious leaders exercise power through elected of ce, exempli ed by Christian Democrat parties or politicians from the Christian far right. We also sought to compare attitudes towards preferences for strong leadership, measured by questions tapping support for non-democratic forms of government by experts or by leaders unaccountable to parliament or elections. Factor analysis con rmed that these political items did indeed fall into four distinct dimensions. Accordingly summary scales were constructed, each standardized to 100-points for ease of interpretation and consistent comparison across measures.
Yet the alternative proposition is that the transformation of social values towards sexuality and women's equality, which has profoundly affected the younger generation in postindustrial societies, may lie at the heart of any cultural clash between modern and traditional societies in general, and between the West and Islam in particular. In this regard, Huntington may have correctly identi ed the importance of civilizational values, but may have misdiagnosed the most crucial aspects of cultural differences. To explore this proposition we can compare support for gender equality, using a standardized scale developed elsewhere, also based on factor analysis, monitoring attitudes towards the roles of women and men in the workforce, education, politics, and the family. 7 The Gender Equality items are similar 7 The combined 100-pt gender equality scale is based on the following 5 items: MENPOL Q118: "On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do." (Agree coded low); MENJOBS Q78: "When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women." (Agree coded low); BOYEDUC Q.119: "A university education is more important for a boy than a girl." (Agree coded low); NEEDKID Q110 "Do you think that a woman has to have children in order to be ful lled or is this not necessary?" (Agree coded low); SGLMUM Q112 "If a woman wants to have a child as a single parent but she doesn't want to have a stable relationship with a man, do you approve or disapprove?" (Disapprove coded low). Three items used statements with Lickert-style 4-point agreedisagree responses, while two used dichotomies, and these items were all recoded so that higher values consistently represent greater support for gender equality. Principal component factor analysis revealed that all ve items fell into a single consistent scale (not reproduced here), with a Cronbach's Alpha of 0.54. For details of the construction, reliability, validity, and distribution of this scale see Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris. to those commonly contained in the more comprehensive psychological scales of sex roles. The gender equality scale was summed across the component items and standardized to 100-points for ease of interpretation. We also compared attitudes using 10-point scales monitoring approval or disapproval of three related dimensions of changing sexual mores, concerning homosexuality, abortion and divorce. 
Part III: Analysis of the Results

Table 3
Mean scores on the political and social value scales Note: For the classi cation of societies see Table 1 . All items have been scaled to 0-100. The signi cance of the difference between group means is measured by ANOVA (Eta) without any controls. *** Sig. P.000. Source: The (WVS/EVS), Waves III and IV (1995-2001) .
democratic ideals, for example whether democracy was better than any other form of government. As others have reported (Klingemann 1999) Table 4 therefore compare the impact of living within each type of religious culture after including controls for the societal-level of human and political development, and individual-level measures for age, gender, education, income, and strength of religiosity. In these models, each type of society was coded as a dummy (0/1) variable. The Western category was excluded from the analysis, so that the dummy coef cients can be interpreted as the effect of living in these societies, after applying prior controls, compared with the effect of living in the West. The data was entered in blocks, including development and social controls in the rst block, then the additional effects of the full model in the second block, including the type of society as well.
The results show that after controlling for all these factors, contrary to Huntington's thesis, compared with Western societies, support for democracy was marginally slightly stronger (not weaker) among those living in Islamic societies. This pattern was evident on three indicators: approval of the way democracy works in practice, support for democratic ideals, as well as disapproval for the idea of strong government leaders. It should be stressed that the difference on these items between Islam and the West were extremely modest in size, as shown by the strength of the standardized beta coef cient, and the statistical signi cance is largely the product of Note: OLS regression models with blockwise entry with the political value scales as the dependent variables. The full model is illustrated in Table A1 . Block 1 in all models control for the level of human development (Human Development Index 1998), level of political development (Freedom House 7-point index (reversed) of political rights and civil liberties [1999] [2000] , age (years), gender (male = 1), education (3 categories from low to high), income (10 categories), and religiosity. Block 2 then enters the type of society, based on the predominant religion, coded as dummy variables. Western societies represent the (omitted) reference category. The coef cients can be understood to represent the effect of living in each type of society compared with living in Western societies, net of all prior controls.
Political value scales: For details see Table 2 .
Type of society: see Table 1 the large number of respondents in the pooled sample, but nevertheless the difference was in the contrary direction to that predicted by the Huntington thesis. Moreover, as observed earlier, even after introducing controls, lower support for democratic values was found in many other types of non-Western society, especially countries in Eastern and Central Europe, and Latin America, while the Sinin/Confucian states showed the greater approval of strong government. At the same time, after introducing all the controls, Islamic societies did display greater support for a strong societal role by religious authorities than do Western societies. This pattern persists despite controlling for the strength of religiosity and other social factors, which suggests that it is not simply reducible to the characteristics of people living in Islamic societies. Yet this preference for religious authorities is less a cultural division between the West and Islam than it is a gap between the West and many other types of less secular societies around the globe, especially in Sub Saharan Africa and, to a lesser extent, in Latin America.
To examine these results in more detail, Figures 2 and 3 compares the location of each nation on these scales. Of all countries under comparison, Russia proved a striking outlier in Figure 2 , displaying widespread disillusionment with the way that democratic processes worked, as well as little enthusiasm for democratic ideas. Other Orthodox societies also showed minimal faith in democracy, including the Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Georgia and Macedonia. A few other developing countries from different cultures proved extremely critical of the way that democracy worked in practice, although showing greater support for democratic ideals, including Tanzania, Brazil and Poland. Many diverse cultures were located in the middle of the distribution, including Turkey and Jordan as Islamic societies, as well as the United States, Italy, and the Netherlands. Nations that gave the strongest endorsement for democratic ideals and practices included the Scandinavian societies of Denmark, Iceland, and Sweden, along with Germany and Austria, but high support was also registered in Muslim Bangladesh, Egypt and Azerbaijan. Therefore in general slightly lower levels of support for democracy were evident in some Eastern European states, notably in Russia, lending some con rmation for claims of a division between the Orthodox and Western worlds. But attitudes towards democratic principles and performance generally showed a broad distribution across many diverse cultural groups, providing minimal support for the stronger claim that the West is particularly distinctive to Islam in its faith in democracy. Indeed the difference between public opinion in Eastern and Western Europe could be explained equally satisfactorily as re ecting a residual hangover from the Cold War era, and the poor performance of electoral democracies and states in these nations, rather than being interpreted as the result of cultural legacies or the emergence of any 'new' ethno-religious cleavage.
Figure 3 compared leadership attitudes by nation. Support for religious leaders was lowest in many secular societies in Scandinavia and Western Europe, as well as in certain nations in Eastern Europe like the Czech Republic. The United States proved distinctive, showing higher than average support for religious leaders, compared with other Western nations, while Greece was another outlier. At the other extreme, support for religious leaders was relatively strong in African societies including Nigeria, Tanzania, and South Africa, as well as the Philippines, all countries with strong religiosity. Compared with Western nations, many of the Islamic nations expressed greater support for the principle of religious authorities, but they were far from alone in this regard. There is also a fascinating split over the issue of strong leadership evident within the Islamic world; more democratic countries with greater political rights and civil liberties and parliamentary traditions, exempli ed by Bangladesh, and Turkey, expressed greater reservations about strong leadership. To a lesser extent, Jordan also fell into this category. In contrast the public living in Islamic countries characterized by more limited political freedoms, less democratic states, and by strong executives, expressed greater support for strong leadership, notably in Egypt, Iran, and Morocco.
Yet so far we have not compared the alternative modernization thesis that the social values of gender equality and sexual liberalization could plausibly lie at the heart of any 'clash' between Islam and the West. The mean scores on these social attitudes in Table 3 reveal the extent of the gulf between Islam and the West, generating a far stronger cultural gap on these issues than across most of the political values. Regression models, including the same prior controls used earlier, show that many structural factors consistently help to predict attitudes, since egalitarian and liberal values are stronger among the young, women, the well-educated, and the less religious, as well as in modern societies with greater human and democratic development. After these controls are introduced, Table 5 shows that there remains a strong and signi cant difference across all the social indicators (including approval of gender equality, homosexuality, abortion and divorce) among those living in Western v. Islamic societies. Figure 4 shows the distribution of nations on the scales for gender equality and homosexuality in more detail. The results con rm the consistency of the sharp differences between Islam and the West on these issues. All the Western nations, led by Sweden, Germany and Norway, strongly favor equality for women and also prove tolerant of homosexuality. Many other societies show a mixed pattern, falling into the middle of the distribution. In contrast the Islamic nations, including Egypt, Bangladesh, Jordan, Iran and Azerbaijan, all display the most traditional social attitudes, with only Albania proving slightly more liberal. We lack time-series survey data that would allow us to trace trends in the post-war era, to see whether these cultural differences between societies have widened, as we suspect, due to the modernization process in postindustrial economies. Nevertheless, if we assume that people acquire their basic moral and social values as the result of the long-term socialization process, in the family, school and community, leading to generational rather than life-cycle effects, we can analyze these attitudes for different 10-year cohorts of birth. The results in Figure 5 con rm two striking and important patterns: rst, there is a persistent gap in support for gender equality and sexual liberalization between the West (which proves most liberal), Islamic societies (which prove most traditional), and all other societies (which are in the middle). Moreover, even more importantly, the gures reveal that the gap between the West and Islam is usually narrowest among the oldest generation, but that this gap has steadily widened across all the indicators as the younger generations in Western societies have become progressively more liberal and egalitarian, while the younger generations in Islamic societies remain as traditional as their parents and grandparents. The trends suggest that Islamic societies have not experienced a backlash against liberal Western sexual mores among the younger generations, but rather that young Muslims remain unchanged despite the transformation of lifestyles and beliefs experienced among their peers living in postindustrial societies.
Conclusion and Discussion
The thesis of a 'clash of civilizations' has triggered something of a 'clash of scholarship' among those seeking to understand the causes and consequences of ethnic-religious con ict. This task has long been of interest to academe but it has received fresh impetus by the dramatic events and aftermath of 9/11. Alternative interpretations of these issues are important for themselves, but also because they carry important policy implications, not least for how far differences between the United States and Middle Eastern states primarily re ect the views of political elites and governing regimes, or whether they tap into deeper currents of public opinion. To summarize the core components of the Huntington thesis, the claims are threefold: societal values in contemporary societies are rooted in religious cultures; the most important cultural division between the Western and Islamic world relates to differences over democratic values; and, in the postCold War era, this 'culture clash' is at the source of much international and domestic ethnic con ict.
The comparative evidence from this study, drawing upon public opinion towards democracy in more than seventy societies around the globe in [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] Moreover cohort analysis suggests that this gap has steadily widened as the younger generation in the West has gradually become more liberal in their sexual mores while the younger generation in Islamic societies remains deeply traditional. The results indicate that modern Western societies are indeed different, in particular concerning the transformation of attitudes and behavior associated with the 'sexual revolution' that has occurred since the 1960s, fundamental changes in the nature of modern families, and more expressive lifestyles. Equality for women has progressed much further, and transformed traditional cultural beliefs and values about the appropriate division of sex roles far more deeply, in af uent Western societies. But at the same time any claim of a 'clash of civilizations,' especially of fundamentally different political values held by Western and Islamic societies, represents an over-simpli cation of the evidence. Across many political dimensions examined here, both Islamic and Western societies are similar in their positive orientation toward democratic ideals. Where Islam societies do differ signi cantly from the West, in supporting religious authorities, they are far from exceptional around the world. Any blackand-white 'Islam versus the West' interpretation of a 'culture clash' as conveyed by the popular media is far too simple. We need to compare public opinion across more dimensions, and across a wider range of nations in the Middle East, Africa and Asia. Moreover it seems likely that different understandings of what "democracy" means, prevail in different societies: some people are attracted to democracy in so far as it seems linked with prosperity, while others emphasize individual liberty and freedom of expression. Nevertheless our ndings indicate that one needs to be very cautious in generalizing from the type of regime to the state of public opinion in a given country. Support for democracy is surprisingly widespread among Islamic publics, even among those who live in authoritarian societies. The most basic cultural fault line between the West and Islam involves issues of gender equality and sexual liberalization. As another article in this journal indicates (see Inglehart, Norris and Welzel) , these issues have important implications for democracy. But the democratic ideal is widely shared among Islamic publics. Western cultural norms may be rejected, but the goal of living under a democratic government is not -quite the contrary, it is endorsed by clear majorities of the public throughout Islamic society.
Technical Appendix
Table A1
Illustration of the full regression model used in Tables 4 and 5 Approve Note: This illustrates the full OLS regression model, with blockwise entry, in this case with the approval of democratic performance 100-point scale as the dependent variable. Block 1 of the model controls for the level of development of the society and the social background of respondents. Block 2 then enters the type of society, based on the predominant religion, coded as dummy variables. Western societies represent the (omitted) reference category. The coef cients represent the effects of living in each type of society compared with living in Western societies, net of all prior controls. Democratic performance scale: For details see 
